THE UNCONSCIOUS

We have already seen that contrary to what Morrison would have us believe, Rushdoony would not support the Freudian/Adlerian ideas as taught by Crabb.

It is obvious that the issue of the Freudian unconscious is simpler than Morrison would have us think. Morrison states that there are five elements in our argument that Crabb’s doctrine is Freudian-based. Though our argument extends well beyond these five elements and there are misrepresentations in these elements, we will nonetheless address them as Morrison presents them.

Morrison says:

First they point out similarities between the definitions of the word unconscious as given in the secular Dictionary of Psychology, and the use Crabb makes of the idea of unconscious forces within the personality.¹

Morrison admits:

There are indeed likenesses between Crabb’s doctrine of the unconscious and the doctrines of secular psychology.²

Morrison’s justification is as follows:

There are also similarities between the Bobgans’ doctrine of the scientific method and Karl Popper’s.³

Earlier in this paper we exposed Morrison’s error in equating Popperian and Freudian thought. Therefore, based upon his error which we discussed in the previous section, Morrison’s present argument fails. If Morrison would have thought through his idea logically, he would not even have listed this point. Additionally, Morrison refers to “likenesses between Crabb’s doctrine of the unconscious and the doctrines of secular psychology.” Without proof he presents what Crabb preaches and promotes as “likenesses,” as if that is our criticism of Crabb. Our criticism is documented in our book and begins with the following:

The Freudian concept of the unconscious serves as the cornerstone of Crabb’s model of man and methodology of change.⁴

We amply and clearly demonstrate what part of Freud’s theory Crabb uses in the pages following the above quote. It is not a likeness, but rather an important part of Freud’s theory of the unconscious that is used by Crabb. Once more the reader can see how Morrison uses words to misrepresent what we say and to alter what Crabb teaches.

Morrison says:

Secondly, the Bobgans find fault with Crabb for finding anything of value in Freud.⁵
Obviously we have not found fault with Crabb for finding some small tidbit from Freud which might be tangential to his model of man. We are concerned with the overwhelming influence of Freudian thought on Crabb’s model. Nevertheless, Morrison continues his argument by saying:

In the same way, too, a Christian can praise a non-Christian for what is valuable in his thinking without becoming allied with his ethical rebellion against God, just as the Bobgans praise Popper as a “world-renowned scholar and philosopher of science.”

This second point is problematic in several respects. First, contrary to what Morrison says, we do not “find fault with Crabb for finding anything of value in Freud.” We do find fault with Crabb for claiming that he found his version of the Freudian unconscious in Scripture and for then using it as a foundational element in his counseling model. Second, we do not “praise Popper as a “world-renowned scholar and philosopher of science.” We merely list his credentials as stated by others. Third, Morrison’s second element fails for the same reason his first element failed. As we have shown in the previous section and restated above, there are two different kinds of thinking, Freudian and Popperian. To quote a well-known philosophical statement, “Not all four-legged animals are dogs.”

Morrison then goes on to say:

A Christian’s thinking can be stimulated and helped forward by what the non-Christian has to say, just as Jay E. Adams was encouraged by what he read in the secular psychologist O., Hobart Mowrer. If by “Christian’s thinking,” Morrison means biblical theology, for which Crabb uses Freudian and Adlerian thought, then we severely disagree. If Morrison is suggesting that Adams’ theology was “stimulated and helped forward by what the non-Christian [i.e. Mowrer, Glasser, Freud, Rogers] has to say,” he is dead wrong! It is interesting that the two following quotes used by Morrison prove he is wrong.

I am not a disciple of Mowrer or William Glasser. . . . I stand far off from them. Their systems begin and end with man. . . . their presuppositional stance must be rejected totally. Christians may thank God that in his providence he has used Mowrer and others to awaken us to the fact that the “mentally ill” can be helped. But Christians must turn to the Scriptures to discover how God (not Mowrer) says to do it.

. . . neither Mowrer nor Glasser has solved the problem of responsibility. The responsibility they advocate is a relative, changing human responsibility; it is a non-Christian responsibility which must be rejected as fully as the irresponsibility of Freud and Rogers.

Morrison evidently thinks there is a parallel between Adams’ and Crabb’s response to psychology. But, Adams learned that psychology does not have anything to offer. Mowrer’s rhetorical question, “Has Evangelical religion sold its birthright for a mess of psychological
“pottage?” did indeed drive Adams back to the Scriptures. When Adams looked at psychological counseling theories and therapies he saw they were bankrupt.

Crabb’s situation is quite different. He does not “stand far off from” Freudian and Adlerian thought. Instead of abandoning the psychological models and methods in favor of Scripture, Crabb has embraced the presuppositional stance of a Freudian/Adlerian unconscious filled with material which drives behavior. Crabb’s system is an adaptation of Freud. Adams, on the other hand, did not adapt from Mowrer. Adams was encouraged to quit looking for the answers in psychology and to go to Scripture instead.

Jay Adams would deny that his theology has been altered one iota or been “stimulated and helped forward by what the non-Christian [i.e. Mowrer, Glasser, Freud, Rogers] has to say.” Adams refers to these individuals to demonstrate how wrong they are, not how much his theology has been influenced by them.

Following his misrepresentation of what Adams means, Morrison lists a number of quotes from Crabb and claims “some interesting parallels to what Adams said.” These quotes demonstrate that Crabb believes psychodynamic theory is valuable and “that Freud was correct on at least three counts.” These are not parallels to “what Adams has said,” as Adams would deny both of the above quotes.

Morrison ends his second element by saying that the Bobgans “cannot impugn him [Crabb] . . . for being willing to learn from Freud.” Morrison so quickly either loses the focus or changes it. We critique Crabb for using the unproven Freudian unconscious as the base of his psychotheological system for dealing with problems of living. “Crabb’s openness to Freud” is “different in principle to Adams openness to Mowrer.” The difference is that Crabb is open to the use of the Freudian unconscious in his system and Adams is not open to Mowrer’s psychology. Nor is his counseling theology influenced by it.

Morrison says:

_Thirdly_, they quote a particular aspect of Freud’s doctrine of the unconscious that is indeed biblically objectionable, but they leave the reader unaware until four pages later that Crabb explicitly rejects Freud at that point.

Morrison criticizes us for not clarifying a statement about Crabb until “four pages later.” This is the quote about Freud to which he is referring and it occurs on page 126:

Freud stated that the unconscious is a place where all kinds of powerful drives and mysterious motivations cause people to do what they do, whether they want to or not.

Then he says that we give our clarification “four or five pages later.” Yes, we do give additional clarification on those pages. However, Morrison entirely missed our statement on page 125, before the above cited passage. Here we say:

Crabb does not agree with all that Freud taught and even sees errors in his theories, but he insists that “the error of Freud and other dynamic theorists is _not_ an insistence that we pay close attention to unconscious forces within personality.”
Therefore, we were careful to state early in this section on Freud that “Crabb does not agree with all that Freud taught and even sees errors in his theories.”

Then based upon his careless reading, Morrison makes this unfounded accusation:

. . . throughout the intervening pages of criticism of Crabb, the Bobgans have allowed their readers to believe that Crabb’s doctrine is identical with Freud’s in its entirety.

The intervening pages to which he refers are pages 126 to 130. In spite of the fact that we clearly say on page 125 that “Crabb does not agree with all that Freud taught and even sees errors in his theories,” Morrison says:

Every statement of criticism the Bobgans make of Crabb in those pages therefore carries with it a negative emotional force that is likely to grip an unsuspecting reader and persuade him or her to accept the Bobgans’ criticisms as factual, without careful analysis.

Morrison’s word therefore in the middle of that sentence relies upon his own careless reading.

Morrison continues with his fourth element:

_Fourthly_, they assert that Crabb teaches what he does “without Scriptural warrant;” “without providing a _biblical_ definition of the _unconscious_;” and without providing “biblical verification of his view.”

Morrison says:

Quoting Psalm 139:23-24, they then say what is undeniably true: “. . . the Lord Himself knows and understands exactly what lies hidden beneath the surface of every person. He knows and He brings cleansing to those inner parts that we may never understand.”

Morrison goes on to say:

However, the wonderful fact of God’s grace, that “He knows and He brings cleansing to those inner parts that we may never understand,” does not mean (1) that those parts do not exist; (2) that it is inherently impossible for us to learn to understand them; or (3) that we ought never to try to understand them.

Instead, we would say that “the wonderful fact of God’s grace, that ‘He knows and He brings cleansing to those inner parts that we may never understand,’” does **not** mean (1) that those inner parts resemble in any way a Freudian unconscious; does **not** mean (2) that it is impossible for us to know ourselves and respond to the work of the Lord in the inner man without Crabb’s gleanings from psychology; and does **not** mean (3) that we must turn to the psychological wisdom of men to “learn to understand them.”
Morrison believes that Crabb’s brand of the unconscious is biblical rather than Freudian/Adlerian. So far Morrison has not been able to demonstrate that Crabb’s use of the unconscious is biblical. He believes it is because Crabb has said that it is. Morrison often surfaces as many cult followers do; if the leader says it’s so, it’s so.

Morrison’s fifth and final element is the following:

And, fifthly, they quote Crabb in several places, but misrepresent to the reader what Crabb’s words mean.\(^{20}\)

Morrison gives a quote from Crabb followed by a quote from us. He then says:

However, Crabb’s words follow an extended quotation which he has given from a passage of Richard Lovelace, a passage in which Lovelace asserts that during the past two centuries the church has declined in its understanding of the depth of sin, and, in particular, of “the deforming presence of original sin, the compulsive force operating behind the individuals acts of transgression,” whose effect is that “the human heart is now a reservoir of unconscious, disordered motivation and response, of which unrenewed personas are unaware if left to themselves.”\(^{21}\)

He then quotes Crabb as follows:

Perhaps the major error of evangelical churches today involves a deficient and shallow understanding of sin such as Lovelace describes. Many pastors preach an “iceberg view” of sin. All they worry about is what is visible above the water line.\(^{22}\)

In conclusion, Morrison says:

. . . when you read the full context of his words you cannot deny that when Crabb finds fault with pastors who preach an “iceberg” view of sin, he does so because he believes they have failed to read the Scriptures with the same depth of understanding as their forefathers of earlier centuries, not because they have not listened to Freud.\(^{23}\)

We disagree with this. Lovelace and Crabb both have a Freudian orientation. That’s why Crabb quotes Lovelace. They are compatible.

Read in context, Crabb’s words are not suggesting that the failure is due to pastors failing to read the Scriptures. Please note the Freudian metaphor “an ‘iceberg view’ of sin.” This is a key element in Crabb’s psychotherapy. The problem with pastors, according to Crabb’s system is that they need to understand sin “below the waterline,” which is another Freudian expression. In Crabb’s system the view below the waterline is best understood in a Freudian/Adlerian context.

Morrison proceeds at almost every point with half-truths, untruths, and fickle statements, which he firmly believes to be true. Morrison unwittingly poisons the readers mind against the power of the Scripture uncontaminated by Freudian/Adlerian psychology to deal with problems of living.
After 20 pages, Morrison finally comes to one of the crucial questions related to Crabb’s system and then he is incapable of even asking it correctly. He asks in a subheading, “Is the Doctrine of the Unconscious in the Bible?” This question has nothing whatsoever to do with Crabb’s teachings or our criticism of them. The question which Morrison painfully wishes to avoid if possible and disguises when necessary is this: Is the doctrine of a Freudian/Adlerian unconscious in the Bible? There is a huge difference between the two questions. Morrison even begins the subsection by saying, “The crucial question is, does the Bible teach that there is an unconscious?”

Morrison says of us, “. . . but I believe that—at least in part—they fail to see what Crabb sees in the Scriptures because they insist on reading into the word a thorough-going Freudian interpretation which Crabb himself does not put there.” Throughout our critique of Crabb we have explained that Crabb’s use of the Freudian unconscious is similar to Adler’s adaptation of it. For instance, we demonstrate that Crabb’s unconscious (like Adler’s) is filled with a basic motivating force of a need for worth (expressed as needs for security and significance) rather than Freudian id impulses. The dynamics are the same: an active, motivating unconscious filled with needs that directly affect what a person thinks, says and does. That, by the way, is quite different from a passive unawareness or from passive material in our minds of which we are not currently aware.

But, we are surprised that Morrison accuses us of insisting “on reading into the word a thorough-going Freudian interpretation which Crabb himself does not put there.” Morrison already admitted earlier that we have not accused Crabb of such a position. He quoted us as saying:

Crabb is careful to say that he does not believe in unconscious determinism or its complement of early determinants of behavior.

. . . Crabb promotes a combination of unconscious motivation and personal responsibility and insists that a person be held responsible for wrong attitudes and actions which originate from wrong assumptions in the unconscious.

Incidentally, that is also a description of the Adlerian adaptation of the Freudian unconscious.

In our critique of Crabb we confront his use of Jeremiah 17:9 and Hebrews 3:13 to support his view of the unconscious. Morrison criticizes the fact that we deal with Jeremiah 17:9 first and then with Hebrews 3:13 later when Crabb refers to them in the reverse order. Regardless of the reference order by Crabb or by us the burden of proof remains the same. The burden of proof is on Crabb and Morrison to show that these or any other Scriptures teach the Freudian unconscious. Morrison, again, misunderstands what we are getting at and so he completely misunderstands our argument. Morrison misunderstands the purpose of our argument, so he does not recognize its reasoning.

Morrison again admits the following in this section:

Of course his [Crabb’s] thinking and questioning en route has been stimulated by his knowledge of secular psychology. . . .
Morrison also says:

> The important thing is that his [Crabb’s] thinking has been controlled in its outcome by his biblical presuppositions, not by the presuppositions of humanistic psychology.\(^3\)

This is a critical issue that continues to surface. Let’s use a little logic here. If Crabb had not been trained in Freudian/Adlerian psychology, would the substance of his system remain the same? Better yet, would it even exist? The answer is obvious. No knowledge of Freud and Adler would have resulted in no use of their doctrines in Crabb’s system. If Crabb had started with Scripture and remained with Scripture, his system would be biblical and not an amalgamation. If Morrison had stayed with Scripture, he wouldn’t be naively following Crabb. Crabb is an integrationist. Morrison supports Crabb in being an integrationist to such a degree that he sees “red” every time he reads a reasoned argument of ours and ends up avoiding it or playing topsy-turvy with it.

We criticize Crabb for claiming support for a Freudian/Adlerian unconscious in Scripture on the basis that there is no support for what he says in any of the standard Bible lexicons and dictionaries. Morrison’s reply is:

> Since those authorities do not agree with Crabb, he must be wrong, they conclude. This procedure is exactly equivalent to a 16th century scholar going to the lexicons of his day to check on Luther’s new suggestion about the meaning of *righteousness*, and rejecting it because the lexicographers did not mention it. The dictionary-writers might be wrong! To assume they are right is to beg the question.\(^3\)

This is a most outrageously ridiculous reasoning by Morrison. Can’t you just imagine all the cults cashing in on that one?! The cults could all say of the orthodox doctrine consistently supported throughout the ages by biblical scholars, “To assume they are right is to beg the question.” We have demonstrated earlier that Morrison apparently does not know what the logical fallacy of begging the question means. Morrison’s response also reveals his preference for hermeneutics, which is psychological/pathological rather than grammatical/historical.

It is quite a different thing for Luther to have realized the application of Christ’s righteousness to sinners, which is clearly presented in Scripture, from Crabb discovering “new meaning” through implication of what he thinks Scripture might mean in light of the doctrines of Freud and Adler.

Morrison examines our criticism of Crabb’s teaching on Romans 12 and says:

> The Bobgans are showing their usual incomprehension of the meaning of Crabb’s words. Crabb believes on other biblical grounds that there is a deceitfulness within our hearts that wilfully hides from our conscious view many of our motives and beliefs. He comes to Romans 12 with that already established. But if our hearts are deceitful, of course the renewal that Paul speaks of must include that hidden level, not just the level of conscious thought. However, change at the conscious level is also included. Crabb says that “Sin . . . includes unconscious beliefs and motives.” [Emphasis
Morrison’s] It includes unconscious beliefs and motives, but that does not exclude conscious ones.32

Please remember that the Freudian metaphor of the iceberg is used and often referred to by Crabb. It is the basic model of his system. Also, remember that only the tip of the iceberg is above the water line. The rest is below. In conclusion, how much of sin is in a Freudian unconscious? Obviously an overwhelming amount according to Crabb’s model. It is not we who are “showing their usual incomprehension of the meaning of Crabb’s words”; it is Morrison!

Morrison expands his accusation of us as follows:

There is a kind of logical fallacy that is called “false dichotomy.” If I said to you, “The door is open; therefore the window must be shut,” my sentence would sound like nonsense because I doubt that any of us have ever encountered a building where the door and the window could not be open simultaneously. My sentence is an example of false dichotomy—saying that two things cannot be simultaneously true when in fact there is no reason why they shouldn’t be. The Bobgans are guilty of a subtler form of this error in their handling of Romans 12. They point to evidence within the chapter that shows that Paul is referring to conscious thinking, and therefore conclude that he does not also have the deeper, deceitful levels of the heart in view. But nothing Paul says excludes the idea that he means us to apply what he says at every level of our mind.33

To respond to Morrison’s accusation we refer to a logic book which says the following:

The either/or fallacy, sometimes called false dichotomy, consists of mistakenly assuming that there are only two possible solutions to some problem or that solving some problem consist of choosing between only two alternatives.34 (Emphasis his.)

The author of this logic book advises:

To identify the either/or fallacy, look for an argument that makes the false assumption that there are only two alternative (or perhaps three or more) available and that one must be taken because the other is unacceptable.35 (Emphasis his.)

The issue involved here is the one that Morrison has had trouble all along articulating. It is the issue involved in the question that he can’t get right. It is the answer to this question: Is the doctrine of a Freudian unconscious in the Bible? The answer is clearly no. Morrison would like us to believe that the answer is yes, even though the evidence is clear that “Paul is referring to conscious thinking.” Morrison’s logic always seems to evaporate as he develops an idea. This is readily apparent when he says, “But nothing Paul says excludes the idea that he means us to apply what he says at every level of our mind.”36

Rather than falling into the error of a false dichotomy in our argument about Crabb’s use of Romans 12, we are using inductive reasoning. What Morrison must do is to provide
evidence for what he says. We have shown that Paul did not intend a Freudian/Adlerian unconscious here and we have amply demonstrated that it is not revealed elsewhere in Scripture. Therefore Morrison falsely lays the responsibility on us for demonstrating that Paul could not have meant the Freudian/Adlerian unconscious too, when the responsibility is clearly his.

Morrison accuses us of misunderstanding what Crabb means in his use of Jeremiah 17:9. The following is the section of our book to which he refers:

In addition to superimposing his notions of the unconscious upon the biblical term translated mind, Crabb seeks to equate the word heart with the unconscious:

My understanding of unconscious elements within the personality is rooted in the biblical teaching that, above all else, our hearts are deceitful and desperately wicked.

According to God’s revelation the heart is deceitful. However, the deceitfulness of a person’s inner being does not prove or even imply that a person’s heart or inner being is the unconscious described by Crabb. The word heart as employed in Scripture will not support his psychological agenda concerning the unconscious, its crucial role, or its contents.37

Morrison insists that “Crabb makes no such equation” between “the word heart and the unconscious.”38 Morrison says that Crabb’s “understanding is ‘rooted in’ Jeremiah 17:9.” But, if his “understanding is ‘rooted in’ Jeremiah 17:9,” then Crabb is certainly using the heart to support his use of the unconscious. We are not saying that Crabb is saying that the heart of Jeremiah 17:9 is limited to his doctrine of the unconscious. We are merely showing how Crabb uses Scripture to support a Freudian/Adlerian unconscious.

Morrison goes on to say, “‘The unconscious’ is a reasonable term to use to describe the part of the heart where this deceptive process occurs.”39 We would say that a person can use any seemingly “reasonable term,” but when the doctrine of a man is attached to a particular term and the doctrine follows, one is not simply choosing a reasonable term, but rather an entire system. Morrison’s misunderstanding of the use that Crabb has made of secular systems can be seen in his next statement:

The only worthwhile objection to using it [‘the unconscious’] is that secular psychology used it first, and so its use may bring with it a baggage of extra meaning that goes beyond what the Scripture teaches.40

But Crabb is not simply using a term with “baggage of extra meaning”; Crabb has included the Freudian/Adlerian baggage! Morrison would like to be able to divorce Crabb’s system from Freud, but he cannot. The connection is clear. Crabb is not just using a word. His use of the Freudian unconscious is as clear as Adler’s use of the Freudian unconscious. Regardless of who developed a psychological model of the unconscious first, it is still unbiblical.

Crabb’s unconscious (filled with motivating needs) is so similar to Adler’s adaptation of the Freudian unconscious that if one were to remove all direct similarities, Crabb’s model
would collapse. Crabb’s unconscious is as much a derivative of Freud’s unconscious as is Adler’s. And the contents of Crabb’s unconscious are like Adler’s and Maslow’s: emotional “needs.”

Crabb has admitted to learning from Freud and others. His model of the unconscious could not have been solely derived from Scripture, because the Freudian/Adlerian/Maslowian elements are too strong. See *Prophets of PsychoHeresy I*, pages 130 to 134, for a few of the similarities. Crabb’s background is psychology, and he has borrowed from psychotherapeutic systems.

Morrison ends this section of his paper by accusing Jay Adams of “Muddled Thinking.” It should now be clear that Morrison, not Adams, is muddled.

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5 Morrison, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
27 Bobgan, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
37 Bobgan, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158.